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Independent Directors and Shared Board
Control in Venture Finance
Abstract: In most startup firms neither the entrepreneurs nor the investors
control the board. Instead control is typically shared with a mutually appointed
independent director holding the tie-breaking seat. Contract theory, which treats
control as an indivisible right held by one party, does not have a good explana-
tion for this practice. Using a bargaining game similar to final offer arbitration,
I show that an independent director as tiebreaker can reduce holdup by
moderating each party's ex post threat position, potentially expanding the
range of firms which receive external financing. This project contributes to the
literature on incomplete contracting and holdup and improves our understand-
ing of governance arrangements in startup firms.
Keywords: venture capital, control rights, incomplete contracting, board of
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I Introduction
Financial contracting theory emphasizes that residual control can affect ex post
outcomes and ex ante investment (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). The literature
treats control as an indivisible right allocated either to a firm's entrepreneurs
or to its investors (Kirilenko, 2001). The allocation of control may be contingent
on future events, but when a firm needs to make a strategic decision the theory
generally assumes the right is held by one party.
Venture capital is considered an ideal setting to study financing contracts
(Kaplan and Str6mberg, 2003; Hart, 2001).' Yet surprisingly, in most VC-backed
1 Several papers specifically model the allocation of control in VC-backed firms (Berglof, 1994;
Hellmann, 1998, 2006; Kirilenko, 2001), and VC contracts are one of the few empirical settings
used to test financial contracting theory (Kaplan and Strimberg, 2003; Cumming, 2008;
Bengtsson and Sensoy, 2009, 2010).
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firms neither the entrepreneurs nor the VC investors control the board. Kaplan
and Strdmberg (2003) find that a firm's VC investors control the board 25% of the
time, and the entrepreneurs control the board only 14% of the time. In the
remaining firms, 61% of the sample, board control is shared with a mutually
appointed independent director holding the tie-breaking vote.
These data highlight a significant gap in the existing theory. The board has
primary authority over corporate strategy and is recognized as a standard
measure of residual control (Lerner, 1995; Kaplan and Strdmberg, 2003). Yet,
the existing theory - treating control as an indivisible right - applies to a setting
that only occurs 39% of the time, and it cannot explain the most commonly
observed startup board configuration.
To fill this gap in the literature I model the incentives created by shared
control. I consider a board with three directors: one entrepreneur, one investor,
and one independent director (a configuration I label "ID-arbitration"). 2 1 Com-
pare entrepreneur control, investor control, and ID-arbitration. My analysis
applies to a variety of important decisions frequently faced by startup firms -
when to sell the firm, whether to hire a new CEO, how much to invest in a new
technology, etc. - each of which requires board authorization.3 The allocation of
board seats is endogenous to the financing contract (Hermalin and Weisbach,
1998, 2003). The basic setup, assumptions, and conflict between private benefits
and monetary returns follow Aghion and Bolton (1992).
The primary innovation of this article is to develop a new theory explaining
the frequent use of ID-arbitration in startup firms. Under ID-arbitration the
choice of action is the result of deliberation and voting among three directors.
I model a bargaining process similar to final offer arbitration (Stevens, 1966).
The entrepreneur and investor each propose an action. If they propose the same
action the firm will pursue this strategy; however, if they propose different
actions, the independent director must choose between the two proposals.
2 Not all firms that share control with an independent director are under ID-arbitration. The
board may have more than three directors or multiple representatives from each group. I focus
on ID-arbitration, however, because it is the simplest form of shared control. ID-arbitration
applies to firms with multiple entrepreneurs or VC investors sitting on the board, provided the
entrepreneurs as a group have similar interests and the investors as a group have similar
interests. While this is generally a reasonable assumption there are cases where the interests
of early investors may diverge from later round investors (Bartlett, 2006).
3 Board authorization applies to a much broader range of corporate actions than shareholder
voting (Clark, 1986), and the allocation of board seats can be decoupled from the distribution of
shareholder votes (Kaplan and Strimberg, 2003). Consequently, even if a firm's VCs control the
vote of shareholders they do not necessarily control the board of directors.
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ID-arbitration can lead to the efficient outcome in some circumstances
where entrepreneur control is unavailable and investor control would be ineffi-
cient. Because of the risk of holdup, entrepreneur control may fail to satisfy the
investor's ex ante participation constraint. Moving to investor control increases
the monetary returns that the firm can pledge to the investor, but may compro-
mise the project's overall value. The controlling investor will ignore the entre-
preneur's private interests, and the parties may be unable to renegotiate to the
efficient outcome because the entrepreneur is wealth constrained (Aghion and
Bolton, 1992).
By contrast, under ID-arbitration neither the entrepreneur nor the investor
can unilaterally threaten to pursue their preferred action. Instead, they must
propose actions that would be endorsed by the independent director. Similar to
analysis of final offer arbitration (Crawford, 1979), the entrepreneur and investor
have an incentive to converge toward the action most preferred by the indepen-
dent director. This result is analogous to the convergence of political platforms
predicted by the median voter theorem (Downs, 1957). The entrepreneur and
investor effectively create a median voter by adding an independent director to
the board.
The parties have an incentive to find an unbiased independent director. If
the independent director always sides with the same party or otherwise colludes
with one of the primary parties, this arrangement is no different than giving the
entrepreneur or VC full control. Recognizing this concern I do not assume the
independent director is unbiased. He is not a social planner. Yet, even a partially
biased tie-breaking director can increase monetary returns relative to entrepre-
neur control and can reduce the costs of investor holdup that could arise under
VC control. To the extent that there are opportunity costs associated with the
entrepreneur's participation, ID-arbitration may expand the range of firms which
receive external financing.
My analysis suggests a hierarchy of control rights. Firms will use entrepre-
neur control whenever possible. Entrepreneur control, however, may not provide
sufficient revenues to give the investor his required rate of return. When this is
the case, firms will first try to use ID-arbitration. However, in some instances
investor control may be necessary, as it may be the only way to pledge sufficient
monetary returns to ensure the investor's participation.
These predictions are consistent with empirical evidence from VC contracts.
Kaplan and Strdmberg (2003), for example, find that VC-backed firms are more
(less) likely to use ID-arbitration relative to entrepreneur control (investor con-
trol) when there is greater uncertainty regarding the project's financial viability,
and as additional funds are invested. Furthermore, data on the appointment of
independent directors show that they are mutually selected by "unanimous
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consent" of the firm's entrepreneurs and VC investors (Kaplan and Strdmberg,
2003; Broughman, 2010), helping to ensure that an independent director's
interests are not captured by either party.
This study relates to the incomplete contracting literature on the optimal
allocation of control rights. Grossman and Hart (1986) show that decision rights
can affect relation-specific investments and should be allocated to minimize
underinvestment. Emphasizing a tradeoff between cash flows and private ben-
efits, Aghion and Bolton (1992) find that control should be awarded to the
entrepreneur whenever possible; however, investor control may be necessary
to satisfy the investor's financing constraint. The above papers are complimen-
ted by a number of studies, including Berglof (1994), Hellmann (1998, 2006),
Dessein (2005), Kirilenko (2001), Black and Gilson (1998), Marx (1998), Schmidt
(2003), Yerramilli (2006), and Gompers (1995), which focus on the allocation of
control in VC-backed firms. These studies generally treat control as an indivi-
sible right that can be held at any given time by only one party - either the
entrepreneur or the VC investor.4 My study is similar to Aghion and Bolton
(1992), in that the investor's financing constraint determines the optimal alloca-
tion of control. However, unlike the existing literature I do not treat control as an
indivisible right, but rather I model the incentives created by a form of shared
control with a third-party independent director holding the tie-breaking vote.
The closest analogy to ID-arbitration in the literature is state-contingent
control (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). Kaplan and Strdmberg (2003) make this
explicit:
We interpret the situation where neither the VC nor the founder is in control as similar to
state-contingent control. For example, in boards where [independent] board members are
pivotal, it seems plausible that these members will vote with the VC as founder perfor-
mance declines.
This description treats the independent director's endorsement as a signal that
transfers control between the entrepreneur and VC depending on the firm's
performance. It overlooks, however, the dynamic incentives created by
ID-arbitration. Under ID-arbitration, even if a firm is performing well, the entre-
preneur does not have absolute authority to pursue any action she desires; she
4 Two notable exceptions are (i) Yerramilli (2006), who shows that joint control coupled with a
harsh penalty if the entrepreneur and VC fail to reach an agreement may be preferable to
unilateral control, and (ii) Meyersson Milgrom et al. (2007), who model joint control arising
from equityholder veto rights over specific classes of decisions. These studies, however, apply
to a form of shared control which requires consent of both parties, and they do not address the
use of third party independent directors.
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still needs to propose actions that are likely to win the independent director's
support.
State-contingent control and ID-arbitration are conceptually distinct.
State-contingent control determines who gets to decide the firm's action, whereas
ID-arbitration is a three-party decision-making process. State-contingent control
requires an ex post verifiable signal correlated with the state of nature, while
ID-arbitration requires a third party whose preferences are independent of
the entrepreneur and investor. The potential benefit of ID-arbitration is empha-
sized in circumstances where it is impossible to contract over the state of nature.
ID-arbitration can be seen as a mechanism for turning a non-contractible variable
(the state of nature) into a contractible variable (the independent director's
vote) for specifying corporate actions ex post. My goal is not to compare
state-contingent control and ID-arbitration, but rather to show that ID-arbitration
is a distinct governance mechanism6 and to model the incentives created by this
allocation of board control. Since ID-arbitration is the most common allocation of
board control in VC-backed firms, it is important to understand the incentives
created by this arrangement.
This project also contributes to the broader literature on holdups. Contracting
parties may be reluctant to make relationship-specific ex ante investments when
there is risk of ex post holdup by the other party (Hart and Moore, 1988;
Williamson, 1979). The literature suggests several solutions to the holdup pro-
blem.7 Of particular relevance, the contract can use various mechanisms - specific
performance (Aghion et al., 1994; Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996) or an option strike
price (Noldeke and Schmidt, 1995) - to modify the default point if ex post
5 This distinction is particularly relevant whenever the independent director prefers an action
that neither the entrepreneur nor the investor would select if given control. Under this scenario
ID-arbitration creates an incentive for compromise that is not present under state-contingent
control.
6 To further illustrate this distinction note that ID-arbitration and state-contingent control are
not mutually exclusive. The financing contract may call for ID-arbitration as the normal board
arrangement but specify that the VCs will acquire additional board seats if the firm fails to meet
certain performance targets, effectively shifting from ID-arbitration to VC-control in bad states
of nature. Kaplan and Strimberg (2003:288) find evidence supporting the simultaneous use of
ID-arbitration and State-contingent control: shared board control declines (61-52%) and VC
control increases (25-36%) in the adverse state. Approximately 10% of VC-backed firms appear
to use both ID-arbitration and State-contingent control simultaneously.
7 In addition to mechanisms discussed above, contracting parties can prevent holdups though
an ex post message game (Maskin and Tirole, 1999) or renegotiation design (Aghion et al.,
1994).
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renegotiation breaks down. By adjusting the default point, the contract can
change each party's threat position entering renegotiation, potentially reducing
or eliminating the risk of holdup.
My analysis extends the existing literature to intra-firm holdups between an
entrepreneur and an investor. ID-arbitration can be seen as a mechanism for
adjusting a firm's default choice of action. Without an independent director, the
controlling party can use its position opportunistically, causing the firm to
pursue actions that benefit it at the expense of aggregate welfare. By contrast,
under ID-arbitration the parties commit to follow the independent director's
preferred action whenever renegotiation breaks down. While this does not
necessarily lead to the first-best, modifying the default point in this way can
reduce the threat of holdup and potentially expand the range of startup firms
that receive external financing.
Finally, it is worth noting two practical limitations. First, the potential
benefits of ID-arbitration are constrained by various factors, including the cost
of adding a new director, lack of impartiality, risk of collusion, and unpredict-
ability regarding the independent director's behavior. Analogizing to empirical
studies of publicly traded firms, the impact of independent directors on firm
performance is unclear (Bhagat and Black, 2002). While I address some of these
concerns below, my primary goal is to show that ID-arbitration is an alternative
contractual mechanism that may be useful in an incomplete contract setting, not
to suggest that it always leads to the efficient outcome. Second, arbitrating intra-
firm conflicts is not the only, nor is it a mutually exclusive, explanation for the
presence of independent directors in startup firms. Independent directors may
also help monitor management (Gordon, 2007), provide advice (Mace, 1971), and
signal the quality of the firm to outside parties (Deutsch and Ross, 2003). While
such alternative explanations give us a better sense of the various ways, an
independent director can add value, they cannot explain the fact that indepen-
dent directors typically hold a tie-breaking position on the board. I do not try to
explain the use of independent directors generally. Rather, I limit my analysis to
the incentives created by ID-arbitration as opposed to entrepreneur control or
investor control.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model and its underlying assumptions. Section 3 models entrepreneur and
investor control, extending the results from Aghion and Bolton (1992) to a
continuous action space. Section 4 describes and models bargaining under
ID-arbitration. This section also expands the model to consider (i) side-payments
to the independent director (i.e., collusion) and (ii) the effect of uncertainty on
ID-arbitration. Section 5 considers data on board configurations and indepen-
dent director appointment rights in startup firms. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Model setup
Consider the following financial contracting problem. A risk-neutral entrepre-
neur (E) with no initial wealth needs funds K > 0 to start a new venture.
Financing can be obtained from a risk-neutral investor (V) who has unlimited
resources. Consistent with the VC-contracting literature, the number of other
entrepreneurs with worthwhile projects is limited, but there are many parties
competing to finance such projects (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). Consequently,
E has all the bargaining power and can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to V. The
contract must promise an expected return of at least K to satisfy V's participation
constraint. I assume that investment is socially desirable and feasible for at least
some allocation of cash-flow and control rights.
After investment the parties choose an action, a, from a compact action
set, A = [ab, ay]. The optimal choice of action depends on the state of nature,
0, which is realized after investment. Following Grossman and Hart (1986) and
Aghion and Bolton (1992) I model contractual incompleteness by assuming
that the state of nature is impossible to describe in the ex ante contract, but
can be observed by the parties after realization. The choice of action cannot
be contracted over ex ante.8 Instead, the allocation of control rights (i.e.,
board seats) determines who gets to select a. The parties can renegotiate the
choice of action after the state of nature has been realized. Similar to the ex
ante contract, I assume that E has all the bargaining power in any ex post
renegotiation.9
The basic setup for my model is similar to Aghion and Bolton (1992) except
for two important distinctions. First, my model uses a continuous action space,
illustrating the potential for compromise. Second, I assume, similar to Grossman
and Hart (1986), that there are no verifiable signals that correlate with 0. This
8 As noted by Maskin and Tirole (1999) this type of contractual incompleteness could in theory
be circumvented by ex post message games. While I acknowledge this limitation of the
incomplete contracting literature, the structured bargaining game that I model in Section 4
generates the first-best outcome under various parameter values, removing any need for ex post
messaging.
9 This assumption, also used in Aghion and Bolton (1992), can affect the ex ante feasibility of
each governance arrangement; however, this paper's main results do not depend on the
distribution of bargaining power or even the availability of renegotiation. In fact, if renegotia-
tion were unavailable or costly, the benefits of ID-arbitration would be increased relative to E-
control and V-control (see discussion in Section 4).
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assumption rules out state-contingent control and lets me focus on ID-arbitra-
tion as a distinct mechanism.
To emphasize the importance of board control, I assume the parties must
form a corporation (the "Firm") to pursue the project, and that each action in A -
whether or when to sell the firm, hire a new CEO, etc. - requires majority rule
board authorization to be implemented. Furthermore, the composition of the
Firm's board is endogenous to the initial financing contract (Hermalin and
Weisbach, 2003).
The project yields two types of benefits: a monetary benefit, y(a, 0),
which can be verified and contractually allocated between the parties; and a
private benefit, b(a, 0), which goes exclusively to E and is non-verifiable and
non-transferable. Both benefits depend on the state of nature, 0, and the
choice of action, a. The investor cares only about the project's monetary
returns, while the entrepreneur cares about monetary returns as well as
private benefits, such as personal satisfaction, the joy of running a family
business, or being her own boss, etc. I assume that the parties can contrac-
tually divide the monetary returns, by giving wy(a, 0) to E and giving
(1 - r)y(a, 0) to V, where 7 E [0,1]. The parties' respective utility functions
can be expressed as:
UE(a, 0, w) = wy(a, 0) + b(a, 0) [1]
Uv(a, 0, w) = (1 - )y(a, 0) [2]
The project's aggregate social utility is the sum of y and b and can be
expressed as:
U(a, 0) = y(a, 0) + b(a, 0) [3]
To illustrate the conflict between the parties I assume that y is increasing in a
while b is decreasing in a for all a E A. As a result the endpoints of the
action set, ab and ay, represent maximizing values for b(a, 9) and y(a, 9)
respectively. To ensure a unique interior-optimum I also assume that b and y
are both differentiable and concave in a and (ay) =! (ab) = 0 for all 0. The
efficient action, denoted by a*, depends on the state of nature and can be
expressed as
a*(0) = argmaxa c{y(a, 0) + b(a, 0)}
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The allocation of control rights is important here, since it can affect the choice of
action. If E has control she has incentive to pick aE such that'o:
aE (0, 7) = argmaxa EA {w7y(a, O) + b(a, )} [5]
If V has control he has incentive to pick av such that:
av(0) = argmaxaeA(1 - )y(a, 0) [6]
Given that y is increasing in a while b is decreasing in a, it follows that
aE < 11 Absent renegotiation, neither party has an incentive to pursue
the efficient action.
The timing of events is as follows. At date 0 the parties enter a contract
specifying the division of cash-flow rights r and the allocation of board control. At
date 1 the state of nature 0 is revealed. The parties can "renegotiate" the choice of
action between date 1 and date 2.12 At date 2 the firm implements the selected
action a. At date 3 monetary returns and private benefits are realized and the
contract is executed. The time structure of the model is summarized in Figure 1.
At the time of investment, the parties contract over only two parameters: the
allocation of cash-flow rights (represented by w) and the allocation of board
control. To simplify the analysis of cash-flows I assume that the parties share
monetary returns in a linear manner, wy to E and (1 - r)y to V.' 3 The conflict
10 My analysis throughout this paper assumes that each non-independent director will act in
the interests of the constituency - investor or entrepreneur - that he represents. This view is
potentially at odds with corporate law, under which directors have a fiduciary obligation to
serve the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders. In VC-backed firms, however,
fiduciary obligations place little constraint on opportunistic behavior (Fried and Ganor, 2006),
suggesting it is reasonable to ignore this legal constraint. Alternatively, the action set A can be
thought of as the set of actions consistent with these legal obligations.
11 If E were allocated all of the monetary returns (i.e. if w = 1) then aE = a* and E would choose
the optimal action; however, this would necessarily violate V's individual rationality constraint.
12 The parties cannot contract over future actions at date 0. Thus technically, they are
negotiating the choice of action for the first time after date 1. However, following the literature
I refer to this as "renegotiation" throughout the paper, emphasizing that this bargaining occurs
after the original contract and after the state of nature is revealed.
13 In practice VCs typically hold convertible preferred stock, while entrepreneurs hold common
stock (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). Potential conflicts can arise between preferred stock and
common stock (Fried and Ganor, 2006; Hellmann, 2006; Broughman and Fried, 2010), and a
tiebreaking independent director may be desirable in this context as well. However, because
preferred stock is endogenous to the financing contract I focus instead on the more basic
tradeoff between private benefits and financial returns. The same intuition, however, should
extend to other conflicts that may arise in a startup firm.
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Figure 1: Timeline.
between E and V is driven by non-transferable private benefits rather than
different cash-flow rights.
The parties contract over three possible allocations of board control:
(i) E-control, (ii) V-control, and (iii) ID-arbitration. In the first two cases either
the entrepreneur or the investor, respectively, controls a strict majority of the
board seats and can use this position to unilaterally select the firm's action,
which can be renegotiated immediately prior to implementation.
Under ID-arbitration the choice of action is the result of deliberation and
voting among the three directors. To specify the result of such deliberation, I
assume a structured bargaining process similar to final offer arbitration
(Stevens, 1966). Section 4 provides a detailed description of the structured
bargaining game and its underlying assumptions.
3 Allocations of board control without an
independent director
Before considering ID-arbitration in more detail, however, I first describe
E-control and V-control. This section is a variation of Aghion and Bolton
(1992) extended to a continuous action space.' 4
3.1 E-control
Under E-control the entrepreneur has an incentive to select aE, even though
U(aE) < U(a*) To solve this problem, the parties will renegotiate. E will offer to
14 For ease of presentation I drop most references to 6 and nE from the notation in the following
sections, except where needed for clarification. For example, aE will be used instead of aE ( *, .
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choose a* instead of aE in exchange for a payment equal to
(1 - -) [y(a*) - Y(aE)], which is V's benefit from the renegotiation. After renego-
tiation E's payoff can be expressed as:
UE = wy(a*) + b(a*) + (1 - ) [y(a*) - y(aE) [7]
= U(a*) - Uv(aE)
> U(aE) - UV(aE) UE(aE) [8]
E's payoff after renegotiation [7] is greater than her payoff pre-renegotiation [8],
since U(a*) > U(aE). V will accept E's renegotiation offer since the change in
action benefits V enough to justify the payment, leaving V indifferent between
the two alternatives:
Uv = (1 - iT) y(a*) - (1 - iT) [y(a*) - y(aE)] [9]
= (1 - )y(DE) - UV(E) [10]
As a consequence of renegotiation, E-control will always lead to the efficient outcome.
The problem, however, is that under E-control, the Firm may be unable to
pledge sufficient monetary returns to V. To satisfy V's participation constraint
the following relationship must hold for some 7r E [0, 1]:
EUv (aE) > K [1
When the inequality in eq. [11] does not hold for any ;r E [0, 1], V will be
unwilling to invest under E-control. An alternative governance arrangement is
necessary to satisfy V's participation constraint.
Proposition 1: E-control will always lead to the first-best outcome, a*, through rene-
gotiation; however, E-control is not feasible unless EUv (aE) > K for some ;r E [0, 1].
3.2 V-control
Under V-control, the firm is able to pledge additional monetary returns to V. This
follows since y(av) > y(aE) for any allocation of cash-flow rights. V-control can
satisfy the investor's participation constraint, since K < Ey(av) by assumption. 5
15 We assume that investment is feasible for at least some allocation of cash-flow and control
rights. Since av maximizes the Firm's monetary returns it is equivalent to say that K < Ey(av).
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The controlling investor, however, will ignore the entrepreneur's private
benefits. V has an incentive to select av, an inefficient outcome. Renegotiation
could improve the result, but renegotiation under V-control is problematic. E has
zero wealth and may be unable to bribe V into selecting an alternative action.
Technically E could give up her share, 7, of the Firm's monetary returns.
Depending on the realization of 0, however, this may be insufficient to induce
V to pursue the optimal action. To reach the first-best E must pay V at least
(1 - -) [y(av) - y(a*)]. This payment is only possible if, after realizing 0, the
following relationship holds:
y(a*) > (1 - )y(av) [12]
If renegotiation to the first-best is possible, E's payoff after renegotiation would
be U(a*) - Uv(av) Similar to the previous section, V's payoff will remain the
same before and after renegotiation.
When eq. [12] does not hold, E cannot pay V enough to induce the first-best;
however, provided r * 0, the parties can still renegotiate to an intermediate
action, between a* and av. Since A is a compact set and y is continuous and
increasing in a, there exists a such that a* < a < av and y(a) = (1 - z)y(ay).
E will propose a in the renegotiation game and offer to pay (1 - r) [y(av) - y(a)],
V will accept this offer, since E's payment fully compensates him for the change
in action. This limited form of renegotiation makes E better off than no renego-
tiation, but it does not lead to the efficient outcome. The magnitude of expected
inefficiency under V-control depends on the distribution of 0. The above analysis
can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: V-control is always feasible, since K < Ey(av) by assumption.
However, for some 0, V-control will not lead to the first-best since renegotiation
is limited by E's wealth constraint.
3.3 Limitations of E-control and V-control
Propositions 1 and 2 illustrate a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and pledge-
able income. E-control ensures an ex post efficient outcome; however, the Firm
can only pledge to the investor expected monetary returns equal to Ey(aE). If the
amount invested is greater than this, E-control would violate V's participation
constraint. Moving to V-control increases the monetary returns that the firm
can pledge to the investor, but compromises the project's overall value. Under
V-control the investor will ignore the entrepreneur's private benefits, and the
DE GRUYTER
Shared Board Control in Venture Finance - 53
parties may be unable to renegotiate to the efficient outcome due to E's wealth
constraint.
Limiting our analysis to E-control and V-control, this tradeoff suggests a
natural progression. Use E-control whenever eq. [11] holds, and use V-control
when it does not. The problem is that this may lead to a suboptimal outcome
whenever V-control is needed. The question is whether ID-arbitration can
improve ex post efficiency without violating V's participation constraint.
4 Independent director arbitration
I model decision-making under ID-arbitration with a structured bargaining
process similar to final offer arbitration. E and V will each propose an action,
denoted by aE and av respectively. If aE = av there is no disagreement and the
Firm will pursue this action; however, if aE * av the independent director must
choose between the two proposals. Similar to final offer arbitration, the inde-
pendent director (i.e., the arbitrator) cannot introduce a compromise, but must
simply pick between aE and av. This bargaining process reflects the fact that ID
is not one of the primary parties and is likely to play a more passive role in
management than the entrepreneur or VC. It also ensures that the Firm's action
is supported by at least two out of the three board members.
If asked to arbitrate, ID will select his preferred proposal. For serving on the
board, I assume ID is paid a flat fee (no residual interest in the Firm's choice of
action), and he may also receive access to valuable information relevant to the
industry. ID would like to be appointed to the board of other firms in the future
to continue receiving such benefits. To protect this stream of future benefits, the
ID must consider his reputation among both entrepreneurs and investors. The
16 I do not explicitly model the cost of adding an independent director to the board. Rather, the
model below implicitly assumes zero cost. Even though the cost of an independent director
would generally be quite small, this is an arguably unrealistic simplification. Alternatively, one
could refine the model by stating that ID receives a fixed payment equal to C for agreeing to
serve on the board. Because, the firm needs additional funds to pay the ID it follows that V's
investment at Date 0 would increase to K+C. Similarly, under ID-arbitration V would demand a
larger share of the cash flow rights, sufficient to give V an expected payoff of K + C. This
refinement would not change the analysis associated with Propositions 3 and 4 below (only
change is that "K" would be replaced by "K + C" throughout). This refinement would, however,
complicate the comparative static results discussed in Section 4.5 and illustrated in Figure 2.
The choice between ID-arbitration and V-control would not simply depend on the amount
invested, but also on the cost of adding an independent director. See discussion in footnote
22 below for more details.
DE GRUYTER
54 - Brian Broughman
appointment process for IDs emphasizes this concern. In VC-backed firms,
independent directors are selected by "unanimous consent" of the firm's entre-
preneurs and VC investors (Kaplan and Strdmberg, 2003; Broughman, 2010).
Consequently, IDs who develop a bad reputation among either group can be
vetoed and are less likely to be appointed in the future. This point is confirmed
by data on arbitrator selection in other contexts. Arbitrators who consistently
favor one side to a dispute are more likely to be vetoed by the disfavored side,
and thus less likely to serve as an arbitrator in the future (Bloom and Cavanagh,
1986). Independent directors have an incentive to resolve disputes in an impar-
tial manner. Other considerations, however, such as business norms or a sig-
nificant relationship with one of the two parties may cause an ID to favor one
side over the other. In any event, an independent director's choice between aE
and av is influenced by the importance of maintaining her reputation among
both groups.
To model this, I assume that an ID considers the interests of E and V, with
relative weight r E [0, 1] assigned to E and (1 - r) to V. We can describe ID's
preference ordering as a linear combination of E and V's respective utility. Let
g(r, a, 0) = TUE(a, 0) + (1 - r) Uv (a, 0). ID's preferred outcome, alD E A, can be
expressed as:
alD(T, 0) = argmaxa EA g(r, a, 0) [13]
If asked to arbitrate, ID will select the proposal, aD aE, av }, which maximizes g:
aD (aE, av, T) = aE f g(r,aE) > g(r,av) [14]
av if g(r, aE) < Vg(ra)
If g(r, aE) = g(r, av) the independent director is indifferent between the two
proposals. In which case, she will flip a coin to decide which proposal to
endorse.
The parameter r measures the relative importance of ID's reputation among
entrepreneurs as opposed to investors. If r = 1/2 we can say that the ID is
unbiased. By contrast if r > 1/2 the ID is biased to favor E, and if r < 1/2 the
ID is biased to favor V. By definition there is a one-to-one monotonically
decreasing mapping between r and alD. When r = 1/2 it follows that alD =
since g(.5, a) = .5U(a). Given this relationship, we can also characterize bias by
comparing alD to a*. ID is unbiased if alD = a*; ID favors E if alD < a*; and ID
favors V if alD > a*.
For each ID, r is expressed in reduced form and treated as exogenous to
the financing contract. This is obviously a simplification. E and V could alter
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ID's interests by awarding her a fraction of the Firm's cash-flow rights. In
practice, independent directors in VC-backed firms are often given a small
share of common stock, but I am unaware of large awards that could have a
significant impact on ID's behavior. By ruling this out, I am effectively
assuming that giving ID high-powered financial incentives is not worth the
cost to E or V.
Similar to the previous section, under ID-arbitration the parties can still
renegotiate the choice of action after realization of 0. E and V collectively hold a
majority of the Firm's board seats and can thus renegotiate without needing to
consult the ID. However, as is shown below, the ID remains important since her
preferred outcome affects the parties' bargaining positions entering the
renegotiation.
In this section I make two additional assumptions, both of which are relaxed
in the analysis below. First, I assume that neither E nor V can bribe ID. This
abstracts away from the problem of collusion that can arise in three-party
bargaining (Tirole, 1986). Legal and reputational constraints provide some jus-
tification for this assumption. Corporate fiduciary obligations prohibit director
vote buying. 7 To enforce this prohibition a court does not need to verify the
underlying state of nature. Rather, a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty can
be established by showing that a director received an improper benefit in
connection with a particular corporate action (Clark, 1986). Put another way,
as long as the court can verify side-payments to ID, it does not need to know the
optimal corporate action, a*, to prevent bribes. Whereas, to prevent opportunism
under E-control or V-control a court would need to verify that the action which
the controlling party causes the firm to pursue is not optimal. Fiduciary obliga-
tion may improve ID impartiality, while still being unable to curb all instances of
opportunism by the primary parties.
Even without legal enforcement, if an ID is caught taking a bribe or other-
wise colluding with one of the primary parties, her reputation in the entrepre-
neur or investor community, whichever was harmed by the bribe, may be
severely damaged, reducing the likelihood that such individual may serve
as an independent director for other firms in the future. Similar to above, if
17 Collusion with another party would violate the director's fiduciary duty of loyalty.
18 It should be noted that a particularly robust (and unrealistic) conception of fiduciary
obligations would prevent all instances of ex post opportunism (Hart, 1993; Broughman,
2010). In practice, however, the business judgment rule prevents judicial review of most
operational decisions, unless the decision-making process was tainted by self-dealing (Clark,
1986).
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side-payments are verifiable but the efficient corporate action is not, reputation
may limit collusion even though it is less effective at constraining opportunism
under E-control and V-control.
Nonetheless, it may be unrealistic to assume that law or reputation prevents
all instances of collusion. In some instances, for example, the primary parties
may be able to camouflage bribes to the ID, effectively preventing legal or
reputational sanction. Recognizing this concern, I relax the assumption against
collusion in Section 4.3 and examine the effect that side-payments from V to ID
might have on the firm's choice of action.
Second, I assume that E and V can observe ID's preference ordering and,
similarly, that ID does not make any errors in selecting between aE and av. The
parties are in a long term relationship with ID and want to select an ID with
predictable views. This assumption eliminates uncertainty and simplifies the
analysis, but it may be unrealistic. To address this concern I expand the model
to allow for uncertainty in Section 4.4.
The remainder of Section 4 models the incentives of ID-arbitration. Section
4.1 models the equilibrium proposals aE and av without renegotiation. Section
4.2 considers how renegotiation may affect the outcome. Section 4.3 relaxes the
assumption that an ID cannot be bribed. Section 4.4 expands the model to
consider the effect of uncertainty. Section 4.5 compares ID-arbitration to the
alternative governance arrangements.
4.1 ID-arbitration without renegotiation
Under ID-arbitration neither E nor V can unilaterally cause the Firm to pursue
their preferred action. Instead, they must propose actions that would be
endorsed by ID. To obtain ID's endorsement both E and V will propose actions
converging upon the ID's preferred outcome. E has an incentive to set aE = aID,
since any alternative proposal would make E worse off, either because aE > aim,
or if aE < aID because E's proposal would lose at arbitration to some av > alD
where g(r, aE) <g(r, av). For similar reasons V also has an incentive to set
av = alD. In equilibrium aE = av = tID and there is no disagreement to be
arbitrated. The intuition behind this result is similar to economic models of
bargaining under final offer arbitration (Crawford, 1979) and the median voter
theorem from political science (Downs, 1957; Calvert, 1985). In each case the
disputing parties (political candidates) have an incentive to propose the action
(platform) most preferred by the arbitrator (median voter). The following
proposition shows, without renegotiation, convergence toward ID's preferred
action.
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Proposition 3: If E and V can observe r and renegotiation is unavailable, then:
(i) In a firm under ID-arbitration aE = av = lD is the unique Nash equilibrium;
and
(ii) Investment under ID-arbitration is feasible if and only if K < Ey(alD).
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3 illustrates two immediate benefits to ID-arbitration. First, by con-
verging upon alD the parties are able to reach a compromise solution, between
aE and av, without renegotiation. The benefit of this compromise is clearest
when ID is unbiased (i.e., when alD = a*), since in this case the parties will
converge directly upon the ex post efficient outcome.
Second, ID-arbitration may be feasible in circumstances where E-control
would violate V's participation constraint. E-control is only feasible if
K < E(1 - 7)y(aE) for some r E [0,1], whereas ID-arbitration is feasible when-
ever K < Ey(aD). Since (1 - w) < 1 and y(aE) y(lD) for all r, it follows that
there is a range of investments for which ID-arbitration is feasible but E-control
is not. This occurs whenever, for all 1 E [0, 1] there is an ID such that:
E(1 - x)y(aE) < K < Ey(am) [15]
Without an ID, such firms would have to be operated under V-control,
potentially leading to an inefficient outcome (even with renegotiation).
If eq. [15] holds and the parties can find an unbiased ID, then the firm can
reach the efficient outcome under ID-arbitration, but not under the alternative
governance arrangements. Proposition 3 also shows, however, that without
renegotiation a biased ID would lead to an inefficient outcome. The next section
considers how renegotiation under ID-arbitration might address this.
4.2 Renegotiation under ID-arbitration
Under ID-arbitration renegotiation is desirable whenever ID is biased. The type
of renegotiation, however, depends on whether the ID is biased to favor the
entrepreneur or the investor (i.e., whether alD is less than or greater than a*).
When alD < a* the entrepreneur prefers alD to a*, and will only agree to the
first-best if she receives a sufficient payment from V. In particular, E will
propose a* in exchange for a payment equal to (1 - w) [y(a*) - y(alD)] Similar
to above, this payment will give the entire surplus from renegotiation to E. V will
agree to the renegotiation since the change in action exactly offsets the
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payment. When aD < a* ID-arbitration will always lead to the efficient outcome
through renegotiation between E and V.
By contrast, when am > a* the investor prefers alD to a*. The investor will
only agree to the first-best if he receives a sufficient payment from E.
Renegotiation in this direction, however, is limited by E's lack of wealth. This
is the same problem that we considered in Section 3.2 above. Even though E has
no wealth she can give up her share of the Firm's monetary returns. To reach the
first-best E must pay V at least (1 - -) [y(am) - y(a*)]. This payment is only
possible if, after realizing 0, the following relationship holds:
y(a*) > (1 - )y(alD) [16]
When eq. [16] does not hold, E cannot pay V enough to induce the first-best;
however, similar to the discussion of renegotiation under V-control, the parties can
still renegotiate to an intermediate action, between a* and am (assuming F * 0).
When alD > a* renegotiation is potentially limited by E's wealth constraint.
While renegotiation can affect the action pursued under ID-arbitration, it
has no effect on V's participation constraint. By assumption E has all the
bargaining power and captures the entire surplus from any renegotiation.
Consequently V's welfare is unaffected. V's participation constraint is only
satisfied if the expected monetary returns from ID's preferred action are greater
than the ex ante investment. Thus, ID-arbitration remains feasible if and only if
K < Ey(alD). The above analysis of renegotiation under ID-arbitration is sum-
marized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: In a firm under ID-arbitration, if E and V can renegotiate, the
outcome depends on the relationship between am and a*:
(i) If aD = a* the Firm will pursue the first-best outcome without renegotiation,
(ii) If aD < a* the Firm will pursue the first-best outcome following renegotiation
between E and V, and
(iii) If aD > a*, for some 0, the Firm may not pursue the first-best outcome since
renegotiation is limited by E's wealth constraint; and
The feasibility of ID-arbitration is unaffected by renegotiation. Investment under
ID-arbitration remains feasible if and only if K < Ey(alD).
With renegotiation the efficiency of ID-arbitration does not necessarily depend
on finding an unbiased ID. As long as ID is not biased in favor of V, the parties
can always renegotiate to the efficient outcome. Regardless whether renegotia-
tion occurs, ID-arbitration may be feasible in circumstances where E-control
would not.
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4.3 Robustness to bribes
In this section I relax the assumption that the parties cannot bribe ID to obtain
his support. Suppose there is an imperfect legal/reputation constraint, observa-
ble to all parties, such that ID risks facing a penalty with expected cost equal to
d > 0 whenever he accepts a side payment. This differs from above in that the
legal/reputational penalty is not an absolute barrier to collusion, but merely a
cost. ID will accept a bribe if offered a side-payment greater than d, but not
otherwise.
Since E is wealth constrained, I limit my analysis to bribes from V to ID. I am
effectively assuming that E cannot borrow funds to bribe ID. This simplifies the
analysis. I also think it reflects a realistic asymmetry between E and V's relative
ability to influence an ID. As above, E and V both propose actions, aE and av
respectively, but now V can also add a side-payment to encourage acceptance of its
proposed action. To further simplify the bargaining game I assume that E will first
propose aE Then, after observing E's proposal, V will propose av. V has the option of
including a side-payment to encourage acceptance of its proposed action.
Given this setup, if V offers a side-payment it will be coupled with ay, V's
preferred action. Since the cost of a bribe does not depend on the action proposed,
V has no reason to moderate its proposal when offering a bribe. Recognizing this
concern, E will adjust its initial proposal so that V does not have reason to include
a side-payment with its proposed action. Namely, E will propose
aE = max(aiD, a)where ad E A such that y(ad) = y(av) - d. In words, E will
either propose ID's preferred action (alD), or E will move closer to V's preferred
action so that V no longer has an incentive to bribe ID. In either case, V will agree
to E's proposed action, since E's proposal removes any incentive to actually bribe
ID. The parties may renegotiate, similar to the analysis in Section 4.2, but now
each party's threat position entering the renegotiation is set equal to max(alD, a
instead of to alD as was the case in Section 4.2.
The ability to bribe ID undermines the potential benefit of ID-arbitration,
particularly if there is a weak legal/reputational constraint (i.e., d is close to
zero). ID-arbitration effectively collapses into V-control as d goes to 0. As the
cost of bribing ID goes to zero he effectively turns into another investor
representative on the board. Conversely, if there is a strong legal /reputational
constraint (i.e., d is sufficiently large) the threat of a bribe disappears and
ID-arbitration behaves as described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 above. As long as
there is at least some legal/ reputational risk to accepting a bribe, ID-arbitration
allows the parties to commit to an interior solution between aE and av. Though
its benefits may be muted, ID-arbitration can still moderate the threat of holdup
even if V is able to bribe ID.
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4.4 Robustness to uncertainty
The model described above assumes the parties can observe ID's preference
ordering. It also assumes that ID does not make any errors in selecting between
aE and av. In this section I relax both assumptions by introducing uncertainty.
Uncertainty is more realistic in two important respects. First, it captures the
fact that neither E nor V can perfectly observe r or alD. Second, it also captures
the possibility that ID may simply make errors if asked to arbitrate. In the latter
case, even if r and am were known to the primary parties, the ID may mistakenly
conclude that a proposal generating a lower value in g should win. Introducing
uncertainty over r (or equivalently over alD) can address both concerns.
With uncertainty, convergence to ID's preferred action is no longer a Nash
equilibrium, and the divergence between E and V's respective proposals
increases with the amount of uncertainty. This is modeled in the literature on
final offer arbitration (Farber, 1980; Brams and Merrill, 1983), and in the political
science literature on electoral competition between policy motivated candidates
(Wittman, 1977; Calvert, 1985). While these settings are somewhat different, both
sets of models assume that the distribution of uncertainty is common knowledge
to the disputing parties (candidates). Brams and Merrill (1983) find a non-
convergent Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium proposals are centered on
the median (i.e., Eam), but some distance away from it on each side. Calvert
(1985) shows that the degree of divergence increases with the amount of uncer-
tainty. Since these results are proved in the literature I will not reproduce them
here. Rather, I simply illustrate how uncertainty could affect the bargaining
game.19 To use a near-worst case scenario, I assume that ID's preferred outcome
is distributed uniformly over the action set.
Let A = [0, 1]. I assume that alD is uniformly distributed over A, and the
distribution of alD is common knowledge to E and V. At date 2, the parties'
respective objective functions are:
Uv(a) = 1 - (1 - a)2 [17]
UE(a) 1 - a2  [18]
For this example, the first-best action, a* = 1/2, while E and V have an incentive
to pursue aE = 0, and av = 1. Furthermore, given a uniform distribution, it
follows that ID is unbiased in expectation (i.e., EalD = 1/2 = a*).
19 This example is suggested by McCarty and Meirowitz (2007) at pages 105-107.
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For any two proposals, aE and av, E wins whenever the realized value of alD
is closer to aE, and loses when it is closer to av.20 Since alD is distributed
uniformly over [0, 1] it follows that aE is chosen by ID with probability
(aE + av)/2 when aE < av, and with probability 1 - [(aE + av)/2] when
aE > aV]. The entrepreneur and investor's expected utilities, with alD distributed
uniformly, can be expressed as:
EUE (aE, V){ UE (aE) ((aE + av)/2) + UE(av)(1 - (aF + av)/2) if aE < av [19]
UE (av) ((aE + av)/2) + UE(aE)(1 - (aF + av)/2) if aE > av
EUv (aE, av){ Uv (aE) ((aE + av)/2) + Uv(av)(1 - (aE + av)/2) if aE < av [20]
Uv(av)((aE + av)/2) + Uv(aE)(1 - (aF + av)/2) if aE > av
Given this setup, what actions will E and V propose, absent renegotiation? We
solve for Nash equilibrium (aE, av) in the following proposition.
Proposition 5: In a firm under ID-arbitration, with amL distributed uniformly over the
action set A = [0, 1], and with Uv andUE as stated in eqs. [17] and [18] respectively,
there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium where aE = 1/4 and av = 3/4.
Proof: See Appendix.
In earlier sections, when E and V could observe r (and thus alD) directly, there
was no benefit and a potential cost to proposing anything other than alD. By
contrast, when uncertainty is introduced, both parties benefit (at the expense of
the other) by proposing an action closer to their ideal. Essentially, the parties are
willing to trade off a small loss in the probability of having their proposal
selected by ID, for a gain in the event that their proposal is selected by ID.
Consequently, both parties move away from EalD = .5 and toward their preferred
action. In the current example both proposals move an equal distance away
from EaID, and each party expects to win at arbitration half the time.
This divergent equilibrium is not optimal behavior. The first-best action,
a*= 1/2 gives both E and V an expected payoff of 12/16 (i.e.,
y(a*) = b(a*) = 12/16). From eqs. [19] and [20], however, we find that the
20 In this example, the ID's preference ordering (i.e. g) is symmetric about its optimum (i.e.
g(T, alD + c) = g(T, alD - c) for any c > 0). Consequently, we can simply consider the distance
between each proposal and alD to determine the selected proposal.
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Nash equilibrium (aE = 1/4, av = 3/4) gives both parties a lower expected pay-
off, equal to 11/16 for both E and V. Uncertainty can cause a loss of efficiency
even if the ID is unbiased in expectation.
There is an incentive for E and V to renegotiate. Similar to above, E has all the
bargaining power in the renegotiation. In this example E will agree to pursue a* in
exchange for a payment of 1/16 from V. This would allocate the entire surplus from
renegotiation to E, giving E an expected payoff of 13/16(b(a*) + 1/16 = 13/16). V
will agree to the renegotiation since the change in action benefits V enough to justify
the payment, leaving V indifferent (y(a*) - 1/16 = 11/16). With renegotiation,
uncertainty will not prevent the parties from reaching the efficient outcome.
Uncertainty can, however, make it harder to satisfy V's participation con-
straint. Because of uncertainty E can holdup V for additional payments in
renegotiation. In this example, V's expected payoff after renegotiation is 11/16.
However, if uncertainty were removed, V's expected payoff would rise to 12/16.
This illustrates that the range of investments for which ID-arbitration is feasible
can decrease when uncertainty is introduced. The magnitude of this problem
depends on the expected distribution of 0 and the allocation of bargaining
power between E and V. In some instances, uncertainty may make V unwilling
to invest under ID-arbitration.
Despite this limitation, uncertainty does not undermine the basic benefits of
ID-arbitration. Even with a uniform distribution, a severe form of uncertainty,
the parties still propose compromise solutions that fall between aE and av. In
this respect, the magnitude of holdup caused by uncertainty is less than under
E-control and V-control.
4.5 Comparison of ID-arbitration to alternative
governance arrangements
ID-arbitration effectively allows a continuum of different control allocations,
with E-control and V-control representing extreme ends of the spectrum.
Without an independent director, the firm cannot commit to any action between
the two extremes, aE and av, favored by the entrepreneur and investor. This
problem is not solved by state-contingent control, which merely leads to aE in
some circumstances and av in others. While the final action under E-control or
V-control may be renegotiated, the points aE and av are still relevant since they
define each party's threat position entering the renegotiation, potentially leading
to a significant holdup problem. Under E-control the threat of holdup may
violate the investor's ex ante participation constraint. Under V-control the threat
of holdup may lead to an inefficient action ex post.
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By contrast, under ID-arbitration the parties can commit to an interior
solution. By adding an independent director to the board, E and V effectively
agree to follow the independent director's preferred outcome, aID, whenever they
disagree. The solution provided by ID-arbitration has some similarity to Aghion
et al. (1994), Noldeke and Schmidt (1995), and Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) in
which the contracting parties can set different default positions (e.g., specific
performance) in the event that renegotiation fails. With ID-arbitration the default
position is set equal to the ID's preferred outcome. This can reduce the threat of
holdup in two ways.
First, from an ex post perspective, there is less need for renegotiation. This
benefit is clearest when ID is unbiased (i.e., when alD = a*), since in this case
the parties will converge directly upon the efficient outcome. Even when ID is
biased, however, the use of ID-arbitration can reduce the need for renegotiation,
since each party can only demand to be compensated for the benefits she would
have received if alD were implemented, not for the larger personal benefit
she would have received under her preferred action. While renegotiation may
still occur, the renegotiation payment will be smaller.2 ' Reducing the need for
renegotiation is important since E's wealth constraint limits her ability to pay V
ex post. Because of this concern ID-arbitration will lead to the first-best outcome
in some circumstances where V-control would lead to an inefficient result.
Second, from an ex ante perspective, ID-arbitration may be feasible in
circumstances where E-control would violate V's participation constraint. E-
control is only feasible if K < E(1 - n)y(aE) for some r E [0,1], whereas ID-
arbitration, which generates greater monetary returns, is feasible whenever
K < Ey(alD). As noted in Section 4.1, there is a range of investments for which
ID-arbitration is feasible but E-control is not (See eq. [15]). Furthermore, if there
are opportunity costs associated with the entrepreneur's participation, ID-
arbitration may even be feasible in circumstances where V-control would fail
to provide adequate protection for the entrepreneur's private benefits. The
possibility of E opportunity costs is not included in the model above, but it is
easy to imagine a scenario in which ID-arbitration could expand the range of
firms which receive external financing.
21 We can compare the renegotiation payments under E-control and ID-arbitration. To reach
the first-best under E-control the investor must pay the entrepreneur an amount equal to
(1 - -E) [y(a*) - Y(aE)I; however, under ID-arbitration the investor only needs to pay
(1 - -ID)[y(a*) - y(ID)], where KE and 7TID are the cash-flow rights awarded to E under each
governance arrangement respectively. The second renegotiation payment is smaller since
y(aD) > y(E) and KE < 7ID*
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We can divide potential investments into three ranges based on the amount
invested (K) relative to the firm's expected monetary returns under various
governance arrangements:
* Range 1: use E-control when K < E(1 - w)y(KE) for some r E [0, 1];
* Range 2: use ID-arbitrationwhenE(1 - n)y(aE) < K < Ey(alD) forallw E [0, 1]2;
* Range 3: use V-control when Ey(alD) < K < Ey(av).
The optimal allocation of control rights for each range is illustrated in Figure 2.
*E-control *I-Atbittation -> A-control
Figure 2: Optimal board configuration.
The desirable board configuration is driven by two considerations: (i) ex post
efficiency and (ii) ex ante feasibility. Ex post efficiency favors E-control (always
efficient, Proposition 1) and ID-arbitration (efficient unless ID is biased in favor of
V, Proposition 4) over V-control (potentially inefficient, since renegotiation may
be limited by E's wealth, Proposition 2).
To be feasible, however, a board configuration must pledge sufficient
monetary returns to the investor. E-control is only feasible in Range 1.
ID-arbitration is feasible in Ranges 1 and 2, assuming no cost to add an ID to
the board, and no uncertainty regarding the ID's preferred outcome. 23 V-control
22 I am assuming that there is no uncertainty regarding ID's preferred outcome. I am also
assuming that there is no cost to adding an independent director. As noted in footnote 16, we
could alternatively model ID-arbitration as fixed cost "C" that V would come out of V's initial
investment. This refinement would introduce a tradeoff between (i) the cost of adding an
independent director to the board, and (ii) the risk of ex post inefficiency under V-control.
Range 2 would effectively become "Medium K and Low C", while Range 3 would become "High
K and High C", and the comparative statics would be adjusted accordingly. If we introduce cost
or uncertainty associated with ID-arbitration, the scope of Range 2 may be somewhat smaller,
pushing some firms to use V-control rather than ID-arbitration.
23 If an ID brings additional cost or uncertainty the scope of Range 2 may be somewhat smaller
(see discussion in Section 4.4).
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maximizes monetary returns and is feasible in all three Ranges, but may
compromise ex post efficiency.
This analysis suggests testable predictions. Firms will move from E-control
to ID-arbitration to V-control as the amount invested increases. Also, the size of
Range 2 depends on the IDs preferred outcome. Thus, in markets or industry
sectors where there are less potential ID candidates, or where IDs are more likely
to favor E for whatever reason, we should see less firms using ID-arbitration and
more firms using V-control.
5 Data on startup boards
These predictions are roughly consistent with empirical evidence from VC
contracts. I consider data on board configurations and independent director
appointment rights.
Kaplan and Strdmberg (2003) classify board control from over 200 rounds of VC
financing into four categories: (i) entrepreneur control, (ii) neither VC nor entrepre-
neur control (i.e., shared control), (iii) VC control in 'adverse' state only, and (iv) full
VC control. Their "shared" control category is analogous to ID-arbitration, since the
tie-breaking vote(s) on these boards are held by independent directors. Kaplan
and Strdmberg (2003) estimate ordered logit regressions using this board control
classification, in the order above, as their dependent variable. The dependent
variable increases with the extent of VC control. Kaplan and Strdmberg (2003)
find positive and significant coefficients for (i) the accumulated amount of VC
financing, (ii) pre-revenue ventures, and (iii) firms in industries with a higher
volatility, such as R&D-intensive industries. These results suggest that VC's demand
more control as their financing constraint increases, and when there is greater
uncertainty regarding the startup's financial viability. Unfortunately, since these
estimates use an ordered (as opposed to an unordered) dependent variable,
we cannot separately compare the use of shared control (i.e., ID-arbitration) to
E-control or V-control. These results are broadly consistent with my model.
Kaplan and Strdmberg interpret the data as supporting Aghion and Bolton's
(1992) model regarding the use of state-contingent control. This characterization
makes sense if there are only two actions to choose from. However, if there are
more than two possible actions to consider, as in my model, ID-arbitration can
behave differently: the independent director may prefer an action that neither
the entrepreneur nor the investor would select if given control. My analysis
suggests that the use of shared control documented by Kaplan and Strdmberg
(2003) is not simply an alternate form of state-contingent control, but rather is a
distinct decision-making process.
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To get a better sense of whether independent directors are expected to
perform an arbitrating role, I also consider data on independent director
appointments. In VC-backed firms independent directors are mutually appointed
by a firm's entrepreneurs and VC investors (Kaplan and Strdmberg, 2003). This
selection process is addressed in a firm's corporate charter and in voting agree-
ments negotiated in connection with each round of financing. These documents
typically specify that independent directors must be "unanimously approved" by
the firm's entrepreneurs and VC investors. In other examples, the contract may
specify that independent directors must be approved by a majority of the firm's
entrepreneurs (common stockholders) and VC investors (preferred stockholders)
voting separately (Broughman, 2010). In either case, an independent director
must be separately approved by both the entrepreneurs and the investors. This
selection process, similar to arbitrator selection generally (Bloom and Cavanagh,
1986), helps ensure that an independent director's interests are not captured by
either party. It also suggests that the parties recognize that an independent
director may need to settle a disagreement.
6 Conclusion
This article addresses an important gap in the financial contracting literature.
The literature treats control as "an indivisible right that can be held at any given
time by only one party" (Kirilenko, 2001). In contrast, data from VC-backed firms
show that board control is typically shared - more than 60% of the time - with a
third-party independent director holding the tie-breaking board seat (Kaplan
and Strdmberg, 2003). Existing financial contracting models cannot explain
the most commonly observed startup board configuration.
To fill this gap in the literature, I model the incentives created by a three
member board composed of an entrepreneur, an investor, and an independent
director ("ID-arbitration"). I use a bargaining game similar to final-offer
arbitration to specify a firm's choice of action under ID-arbitration. I show that
ID-arbitration can reduce opportunistic behavior by causing the entrepreneur
and the investor to converge toward the action most preferred by the indepen-
dent director. Consequently, ID-arbitration can lead to the efficient outcome in
circumstances where alternative governance arrangements - entrepreneur con-
trol, investor control, or state-contingent control - are either unavailable or
likely to lead to suboptimal results.
My analysis suggests a natural progression of control rights. Firms will shift
from entrepreneur control, to ID-arbitration, and finally to investor control as the
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financing constraint tightens. These predictions are consistent with empirical
evidence from VC contracts, though further empirical testing is needed to rule
out alternative explanations that are also consistent with existing data.
This study suggests a need to study more complex control arrangements
than what is typically addressed in incomplete contracting models. I expand the
literature by considering a particular three-party board structure (ID-arbitration);
however, numerous other multi-party control arrangements occur in entrepre-
neurial finance. Among other concerns, the model in this article could be
extended by (i) allowing state-contingent control in conjunction with ID-arbitra-
tion, (ii) modeling the use of protective provisions that require unanimous
consent for particular actions (i.e., a sale of the firm may require VC consent),2 4
and (iii) modeling additional constituencies (i.e., multiple investors with differ-
ent interests). Similar to the analysis here, models of voting and coalition
formation from political science may prove insightful for understanding complex
corporate governance arrangements.
Appendix
Proposition 3: If E and V can observe r and renegotiation is unavailable, then:
(i) In a firm under ID-arbitration E and V both have an incentive to propose the
ID's preferred action (i.e., aE = av = ur); and
(ii) Investment under ID-arbitration is feasible if and only if K < Ey(alD).
Proof part (i): Let fE (av) and fv (aE) be best response correspondences for E and
V respectively, given the other party's proposal. I begin with E's best response.
If av < alD no proposal less than av can defeat av, by definition of g. So,
E's best response is to choose aE = av or a proposal that would lose to av. This
implies that fE (av aID) = [ab, av]. Alternatively, if av > alD E wants to choose
the smallest proposal that defeats av. Such a proposal, however, does not exist,
since for any aE < av where g(r, aE) > gr, av) there exists E > 0 such that
g(r, aE - E) > g(r, aE). This follows since A is a compact action set. Thus,
fE (av > aID) = 0. Still, for any aE that beats av it is clear that av > alD is suboptimal
for V. Similar arguments show that fv(aE alD) = [aE, ay] and fv(aE < ai& = 0,
and, similarly, for any av that beats aE it is clear that aE < LD is suboptimal for E.
From above we know that E's best response to av = aLD is given byfE (alD) = [ab, aID],
while V's best response to aE = LD is given by fE (ILD) = [ab, aID]. It follows that
aE = av = lD is a Nash equilibrium because alD is an element of the best response
24 Meyersson-Milgrom et al. (2007) addresses the use of targeted shareholder veto rights.
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correspondence for both candidates. Now I show uniqueness (i.e., aE = av =ID is
the only Nash equilibrium). Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium other than
aE = av = aID. Since fE(av > lD) = 0 and fv(aE < aLD) = 0, it follows that the
only other possible candidates for Nash equilibria must satisfy av < alD E. This
relationship in conjunction withfE (av < lD) = [ab, av] andfv (aE > aID) = [aE, ay]
implies that aE > av and aE < av. This contradiction implies that aE = av = aID is
the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof part (ii): From part (i) we know that V's expected utility from ID arbitra-
tion is EUv(aID, 71). When 71 = 0, it follows that Uv = y for any choice of action.
Thus, if K < Ey(aID) there exists ;r (namely ;r = 0) such that investment under ID
arbitration satisfies V's participation constraint. Conversely, if K < Ey(aID) there
is no allocation of cash-flow rights under ID-arbitration that would satisfy V's
participation constraint, since 7 > 0.
Proposition 5: In a firm under ID-arbitration, with alD distributed uniformly over
the action set A = [0, 1], and with y and b as stated in eqs. [17] and [18]
respectively, there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium where aE = 1/4
and av = 3/4.
Proof: Suppose E knows that V will propose some av E [0, 1]. We can rule out
aE > av since E would prefer av. Treating av as a fixed parameter, E will
propose aE E [o, av] to maximize
maxaE [b(aE) ((aE +av)/2) + b(av) (1 - (aE + av)/2)] [Al]
Substituting b(a) = 1 - a2 into eq. [Al] and differentiating with respect to aE
gives us the following first-order condition:
- -aE - aEav + = 02 2
Solving for aE yields two solutions, only one of which is the range [o, av]. This
solution gives us the following best response function: aE (av) = av/3 Since the
second derivative of eq. [Al] is negative, this solution is a local maximum for
any av E [0, 1].
We can solve a similar maximization problem for V by treating aE E [0, 1] as
a fixed parameter and solving V's objective function
maxav [y(aE) ((aE av)/2) + y(av)(1 - (aE +av)/2)]
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Differentiating with respect to av, we find the following best response function:
av (aE) = (2 + aE)/ 3 . Furthermore, the second derivative of eq. [A2] is negative,
making this solution a local maximum. To find a Nash equilibrium (aE, av) we
solve the following system of equations, given by each parties' best response
function: aE = av/3 and av = (2 + aE)/ 3 . This gives us the unique solution
aE = 1/4 and av = 3/4.
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